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Abstract
China has witnessed the largest labor migration since the reform and opening up policies were
implemented. According to the most recent statistics, the total number of rural to urban migrant
workers reached 136 million. Migrants are defined as persons who have left out of township for
more than 6 months. The migration flow has propelled the economic and societal transition in
China through labor productivity enhancement and social restructuring. Accordingly, the
Chinese government has improved the migration policies with increasing migration flow and the
changes of labor market situations. This report is organized as follows. Section one briefly
introduces when and how the migration started by reviewing the history, size and trend, impacts
of migration in China and the vulnerability of migrants. Section two reviews the main migration
policy changes in the past three decades. Section three illuminates the Lewisian turning point that
marks economic development and transitioning in China. Section four discusses the relevance of
China’s experiences to other developing economies in terms of economic development and
migration policy changes.
Keywords: Migration in China, Labor mobility, Impact of crisis.
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annually, and further research in the field of human development. The HDRP Series is a quick-
disseminating, informal publication whose titles could subsequently be revised for publication as
articles in professional journals or chapters in books. The authors include leading academics and
practitioners from around the world, as well as UNDP researchers. The findings, interpretations
and conclusions are strictly those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of
UNDP or United Nations Member States. Moreover, the data may not be consistent with that
presented in Human Development Reports.
11. Introduction
During the era of planning economy, people were not allowed to move according to
their own willingness. On the contrary, forced migration or population floating happened
sometimes due to particular political purposes. For example, to build up the third front in
1960s and 1970s, a lot of people were moved to central and western China with industries
together. Another example is the reeducation movement during Cultural Revolution
which sent millions of urban graduates to countryside. Considering that the mobility was
not personal choice, it is hard to see positive effect of those kinds of migration in terms of
factor allocation and social development.
It is a different case since the reform and opening up in 1978. Rural to urban
migration has been a historical phenomenon in China, which drives industrialization,
urbanization, and economic growth. The migration also encourages labor market
development through labor mobility and labor reallocation. Migration in China is
dominated by labor migration, which was caused by the rural reform that released surplus
labor from agriculture. With economic development the size of migration keeps growing.
Meanwhile, the productivity growth by moving labor out of low-productivity sectors to
high-productivity ones has been one of the important sources driving economic growth.
Rural Reform and Labor Mobility
Prior to 1978 China had been a typical dual society characterized by economic and
institutional segmentation between rural and urban areas. Rural labor forces were not
allowed to work in off-farm activities or out of collective farms. Meanwhile, the
economic development in coastal areas started creating employment opportunities for
farmers.  As a result, there was no migration in China during that period.
The “household responsibility system (HRS)” initiated in late 1970s made rural
households the residual claimants of their marginal effort, thus solving the long-standing
incentive problems associated with the egalitarian compensation rules created in the
commune system. At the same time, the pricing system of agricultural products was
altered, which stimulated the increase in farm productivity, thus releasing surplus labor
2from agriculture. The higher returns to labor in non-agricultural sectors motivated
farmers to migrate out of agriculture. As the result of labor mobility from agricultural to
non-agricultural sectors and from rural to urban areas, labor markets began to develop
and migration appeared (Cai, et al., 2003; Fan, 2008).
In the early 1980s when various institutional barriers deterring labor mobility had not
been significantly removed, the government encouraged rural laborers to “leave the land
without leaving the village (litu bulixiang)”. In addition to some small-scaled self-
employment activities, the most important channels through which the farmers to move
for off-farm employment was the township and village enterprises (TVEs). Employment
in TVEs increased from 28.3 million in 1978 up to 146.8 million in 2006, which
accounted for 9.2% and 27.7% of rural labor forces in the two years respectively.
Having encountered with strong competition from state-owned enterprises, joint
ventures, and private enterprises since late 1980s, TVEs were forced to improve their
technologies used and quality of products through investing more capital instead of
employing more labor. As a result, TVEs’ absorption of labor force has been slowed
down since the middle of 1990s, pushing rural laborers to migrate across regions.
The gradual abolition of institutional obstacles has been the key for increased labor
mobility since 1980s. Observing the narrowing space absorbing surplus labor in rural
sectors, in 1983, the government began allowing farmers to engage in long distance
transport and marketing of their products beyond local market places, the first time that
Chinese farmers had got legitimate rights of doing business outside their hometowns. In
1984, regulations were further relaxed and farmers were encouraged by the state to work
in nearby small towns where emerging TVEs demanded for labor. A major policy reform
took place in 1988, when the central government allowed farmers to work in enterprises
and/or run their own business in cities under the condition of self-sufficient staples1.
Since then, rural to urban migration has been a more and more significant phenomenon in
China.
With abolition of institution barriers that blocked migration flow, the significant
rural-urban income disparities have become a long-existing force that drives migration
                                                          
1 At the time, rationing system of food and necessities had not been abolished and people without local
hukou were not entitled coupon for buying food and other necessities on the local market.
3flow. As shown in Figure 6, the ratio of urban household income per capita to rural
household income per capita was 2.57 in 1978. Under such circumstance, the rural labor
forces have a strong incentive to work in urban labor market.
The regional disparities determine the direction of migration flow. According to Cai
and Du (2000), the economic takeoff in coastal regions has increased the regional
inequality among China’s provinces since 1990, which in turn caused rural labor in
Central and Western China to migrate to the developed regions.
The Size and Trend of Migration
In 1978, there were 283 million rural labor forces who worked in agriculture, which
accounted for 93 percent of rural labor. With economic development and reforms, an
increasing size of rural to urban migration flow has been seen in China. In contrast to
other developing countries, labor mobility presents a circulated pattern due to historically
existed segmentation between rural and urban areas at the core of hukou system.
At the early stage of the reforms, there was only a small amount of labor migration.
The composition of migration flow was dominated by craftsman who moved within rural
areas. With increasing labor productivity in agriculture, rural labor forces began to move
out of rural areas with increasing size. According to estimation by MOA (2001), the total
amount of rural migrants was only 2 million in 1983 but reached 30 million by the end of
1980s. The economic booming after 1992 significantly encouraged migration. Fast
economic growth in coastal areas attracted more and more rural labor forces from other
parts of China to seek off-farm job vacancies. According to MOA (2001), the migrant
workers amounted to 62 million in 1993 and the number climbed to 75.5 million in 2000.
In the new century, National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) started collecting the
information of migrants in rural household survey, so we can get a continuous series of
size of migration based on consistent sampling surveys. As Table 1 displays, the total
number of migrants has kept growing and reached 136 million in 2007. It is obvious that
migrant workers have been substantial role on urban labor market. In 2007, migrant
workers accounted for 46.5 percent of total urban employment.
4Table 1 Migrant Workers and Urban Employment
Year Migrant
Workers_million
_
Urban Employment
_million_
Ratio
_1/2, %_
2000 78.49 212.74 36.9
2001 83.99 239.4 35.1
2002 104.7 247.8 42.3
2003 113.9 256.39 44.4
2004 118.23 264.76 44.7
2005 125.78 273.31 46.0
2006 132.12 283.1 46.7
2007 136.49 293.5 46.5
Source: National Bureau of Statistics (NBS), China Statistical Yearbook (various years),
China Statistics Press; National Bureau of Statistics (NBS), China Yearbook of Rural
Households Survey (various years), China Statistics Press.
Considering that migrant workers concentrated in coastal areas where the most
export oriented and labor intensive industries locate, however, the recent financial crisis
is possible to further slow down the trend of migration in the near future. As Figure 1
indicates, in the most employment concentrated areas, Pearl River Delta and Yangtze
River Delta, there is a tendency of employment increase with shares of export increasing.
With the financial shock, it is good to believe that the crisis has serious negative impacts
on employment. In addition, most low skilled rural migrant workers work in the labor
intensive firms, so the financial tsunami brings more shocks to migrant workers this time.
A widely reported phenomenon that a large amount of migrant workers return their
hometowns in advance proves our conjecture.
5Figure 1 Exports and Employment in Manufacturing
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Note: the horizontal axis is the ratio of exported value to total sale value in sub-sectors of
manufacturing, and the vertical axis is the employment in the sub-sectors.
Source: National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) (2007), Data on Economic Census, China
Statistical Press.
The Impact of Migration
Since the rural to urban labor mobility dominates the migration in China, it is good
to believe that the labor transfer from low productivity sector to high productivity sector
improves the economic efficiency and provides source of economic growth. Wage
incomes are more and more important income sources of rural households. The
remittances from migrants play active role on poverty reduction in rural China. A study
shows that, migration raises the income of poor households to a larger extent than that of
rich households. Poverty headcount, poverty depth, and poverty severity are significantly
lower in the presence of migration in the case of Hubei. Remittances not only narrow the
6income gap among rural poor households, but also disproportionately improve income of
the poorest poor (Zhu and Luo, 2008).
A host of studies suggest that the fast growth of the Chinese economy has benefited
from the improvement of TFP and increase in share of TFP’s contribution to overall
growth (for example, Perkins, 2005 and Wu, 2003). The successful reform in the past
decades not only enhanced technical efficiency by improving incentive mechanism at
micro management level, but also gained resources allocative efficiency by developing
markets of production factors, especially by promoting labor mobility. Cai and Wang
(1999) decompose the GDP growth in the period of 1982 to 1997 into five sources:
physical capital, labor quantity, human capital, labor allocation and TFP. The labor
allocation (labor mobility from agriculture to non-agricultural sectors) contributed 20
percent to overall growth. Other research also proves that the labor market development
makes up a key part of the improvements of efficiency during the reform (World Bank,
1997).
In addition, under current institutional arrangement that rural migrants are hardly to
get permanent living residency in urban areas, the huge migration could distort the
demographic structure in rural area. Rural-to-urban migration under the present
institutional arrangement adds labor force to urban sector, whereas it leaves rural
population less productive. Because of the hukou control, migrant workers do not expect
to live in cities permanently, in most cases their spouses, parents, and children left behind
in home villages. Higher rate of aging, feminization, and large proportion of children in
rural area make rural population more dependent, weakening the capability of social and
economic development in rural area.
The Vulnerability of Migrants
Since the 1980s, China has implemented, to varying degrees, reforms in different
social and economic systems that are aimed at dividing up the urban and rural labor
markets. These reforms have brought forth many changes such as relative relaxation in
the hukou system, the building-up of a socialized welfare system for urban dwellers,
gradual marketization of labor and employment, and increasing mobility of work forces,
7particularly those moving from the farmland to non-agricultural businesses and
enterprises in the countryside, or to those in small and medium-sized and even large
cities. But the hukou system, because of its half-baked reform as regards fundamental
issues, still functions as an “invisible wall” that defines the different identities of urban
residents and migrant workers from the countryside, and treats migrants differently (Chan
and Zhang, 1999). Rural migrants holding their rural hukou mostly are low-skilled and
work in three D occupations in urban labor market. Even worse, they are not well
protected by current social protection system because most of them work in informal
sectors. The informality of migrant workers leads to vulnerability.
The Chinese labor market has witnessed a process of informalization in recent
years. Since the informal employment is easily ignored in formal statistics system, it is
hard to get the size of the informal sector directly. Some studies estimated the share of
informal employment in the overall employment on urban labor market and gave an
interval between 30 percent and 40 percent of workers who work informally (Cai, et. al,
2005; Du et. al., 2006).
In addition to the informaliztion caused by urban labor market dislocation happened
in the late 1990s, migrant workers have been a large component of informal sector since
they appeared in urban labor market. According to migrant surveys done in five big cities
in China, the proportion of migrants who worked in the informal sectors was 73 percent
in 2001 and 84 percent in 2005.
Using the 1% Population Sampling Survey data in 2005, which is national
representative, we may observe the whole picture of informality for both migrant workers
and local residents. We categorize three types of workers in urban labor market, local
workers, rural migrant workers, and urban migrant workers. In contrast, most rural
migrant workers (65.4%) work informally while the proportion for urban migrant
workers is 29.8 percent. Table 2 presents the outcomes calculated from the data by
various groups of people with different characteristics.
8Table 2 Informality in Non-Agricultural Sectors (%)
Rural Migrant
Workers
Local Workers All Workers
All 65.4 52.5 52.6
By Age Group
20 and below 59.6 79.8 68.8
21-30 60.2 53.6 51.9
31-40 69.8 51.3 52.5
41-50 74.2 47.5 48.2
51-60 76.6 51.2 51.5
61 and above 78.3 71.3 70.3
By Education
Primary School and below 80.0 82.9 81.7
Junior High School 65.5 69.2 67.4
Senior High School 50.4 35.4 36.8
College and above 26.0 7.1 8.2
By Gender
Male 66.5 52.9 53.1
Female 64.0 51.9 51.9
Source: Author’s calculation from 2005 1% sampling survey.
As Table 2 indicates, for migrant workers, the proportion of workers in informal
sector increases with aging, which implies that the older the migrant workers are, the
more disadvantaged they are. The informality-age profile is different for local workers:
with age increasing, the share of workers in informal sector decreases first and then
increases. Education plays the same role for both migrant and local workers: the educated
workers are less possible to work in informal sectors.
As we see above, most of migrants in urban labor market worked in the informal
sectors. Considering that migration workers have already accounted for a fairly large
share of employment in urban labor market evidenced by Table 1, China needs to pay
more attention to this group of people for decent work. When comparing with those
9workers with urban hukou, rural migration workers are more disadvantaged in urban
labor market in terms of earnings, working intensity, and social protection.
Thanks to urban labor market surveys (CULS1) conducted by Institute of
Population and Labor Economics, comparable individual data using the same survey
instrument and sampling strategy are available. As Table 3 presents, since migrant
workers are less protected by current social protection system, they have to work
intensively to achieve the similar living standard as their urban local counterparts.
Table 3 Disadvantages of Migration Workers on Urban Labor Market
2001 2005
Local
Workers
Migrant
Workers
Local
Workers
Migrant
Workers
Informal work
Working days per week 6.4 6.8 6.0 6.8
Working hours per day 9.3 10.8 8.9 10.6
Monthly earning (yuan) 968 991 1094 976
Pension - - 54.8 2.1
Unemployment insurance - - 12.6 0.4
Working Injury Insurance - - 6.0 1.2
Health Insurance - - 32.6 1.3
Formal work
Working days per week 5.3 6.4 5.3 6.0
Working hours per day 8.3 9.5 8.2 8.7
Monthly earning (yuan) 1001 776 1387 1247
Pension - - 82.1 29.0
Unemployment insurance - - 39.7 17.8
Working Injury Insurance - - 29.1 31.7
Health Insurance - - 71.4 29.7
Source: Authors’ calculation from CULS data.
                                                          
1 This survey was conducted by the Institute of Population and Labor Economics, Chinese Academy
of Social Sciences in 2005. In Shanghai, Shenyang, Wuhan, Xi’an and Fuzhou, 500 urban households
and 500 migrant households were sampled in each city. In Wuxi, Benxi, Yichang, Baoji, Zhuhai,
Shenzhen and Daqing, 400 migrant households were sampled in each city.
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The vulnerability of migrants is also reflected on some other aspects such as wage
arrears, HIV/AIDS, STDs and bad living conditions. Since 2003, the Chinese government
has taken many measures to try to solve wage arrears of migrants. However, migrants are
still suffering from it. According to a survey on migrants conducted by National Bureau
of Statistics in 2006, 32.4 percent of migrants who work in construction suffer from wage
arrears, which is the highest among these six sectors. 12.5 percent of migrants who work
in manufacturing suffer from wage arrears, which is the lowest among the sectors (Figure
2).
Figure 2 Proportions of Migrants Suffering from Wage Arrears by Sector
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Source: Wang (2008).
Table 4 reviews some studies on STDs which were conducted in different provinces
in China. Migrants’ share in reported STD cases varies considerably. In Jiangsu’s
Xinghua, it is only 7.5 percent. In Shenzhen, it is 69.0 percent. As for the considerable
variation on migrants’ share across the studies, Yang argues that it can hardly be taken as
evidence that the role of floating migration in the spread of STDs also varies from place
to place and is therefore inconclusive; rather, it may reflect differences in the extent of the
presence of floating migrants’ in the general population across places (Yang, 2004).
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Table 4 Reported STDs by Migration Status in Selected Provinces
Province/City Reported
STD Cases
Reported Year
(s)
Temporary
Migrants (%)
Permanent
Residents (%)
Guangdong/Shenzhen 1570 1997-1998 1084 (69.0) 486 (31.0)
Liaoning/Lianyungang 13464 1989-1998 2343 (17.4) 11121 (82.6)
Jiangsu/Xinghua 6119 1991-2000 457 (7.5) 5662 (92.5)
Guangdong/Shenzhen 102538 1983-2000 59400 (57.9) 43138 (42.1)
Liaoning 26038 1998 3787 (14.5) 22251 (85.5)
Beijing/Shijingshan 3492 1990-1999 1189 (34.0) 2303 (66.0)
Shanghai 79980 1994-1997 17962 (22.5) 62018 (77.5)
Source: Reproduced from Yang (2004).
Table 5 reviewed some studies on HIV/AIDS in selected provinces. Migrants’ share
in HIV/AIDS cases varies considerably too, which is the similar to the case of STDs. In
Guangxi’s Wuzhou, it is only 9.5 percent. In Shanxi, it is 66.7 percent. We do see that
migrants become an important component of HIV/AIDS cases.
Table 5 HIV/AIDS Cases by Migration Status in Selected Provinces, China
Province/City Total HIV/AIDS
Cases
Reported Year
(s)
Temporary
Migrants (%)
Permanent
Residents (%)
Shanxi 174 1995-1999 116 (66.7) 58 (33.3)
Guangxi/Wuzhou 148 1998-2000 14 (9.5) 134 (90.5)
Yunnan/Chuxiong 226 1991-2000 27 (11.9) 199 (88.1)
Jiangsu 133 1986-6/2001 85 (63.9) 48 (36.1)
Liaoning 137 1991-7/2001 43 (31.4) 94 (68.6)
Guangzhou 267 1985-1999 150 (56.2) 117 (43.8)
Fujian 188 1987-2000 80 (42.6) 108 (57.4)
Source: Reproduced from Yang (2004).
Migrants’ living conditions are bad. According to a survey on migrants conducted
by National Bureau of Statistics in 2006, 6.5 percent of migrants live in working shed,
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7.8 percent live in working site, 30.4 percent live in dormitory, 23 percent live in house
with bathroom or kitchen or neither and only 21 percent of migrants live in house with
both bathroom and kitchen. The remaining 11.3 percent of migrants live in other places
(Figure 3).
Figure 3 Proportions of Migrants Living in Different Places
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In fact, the vulnerability of rural migrants is rooted from segmented institutional
arrangement at the core of hukou system. Despite of some experiments on hukou reform
at local level, the current hukou system prevents migrant workers from being able to
receive the necessary housing, medical care, children’s education, and other public
services at reasonable prices. The current phase of dual economy development is
characterized by emerging third category of population – the migrant workers and their
accompanying dependents, apart from permanently registered rural and urban residents.
The exclusion of migrants from the basic social security system is inconsistent with the
overall goals set by the central government to equalize social welfare and public services
between rural and urban residents. Without hukou system reform, migrants are very much
likely to be left behind in the progress of rural and urban social security system building.
At a glance, there seems a paradox – the more welfare the hukou identity contains,
the more difficult it is for the reform to push forward, whereas the affiliated welfare
13
factors exist if the reform of hukou system remains hovered. However, if the reform in
this area takes an indirect approach – that is, to focus on peeling off the function of
welfare provision from hukou status instead on changing hukou identity for certain group
of people, once the difference in social welfare between rural and urban areas and the
hukou status no longer serves as a nameplate to identify whether or not a person should
be provided with a certain public service, the dilemma facing the reform can be broken.
Since the beginning of the new century, a host of reforms of welfare regimes
affiliated with hukou status, including accesses to social security, social protection,
compulsory education, and other public services have been under way. Not only has
central government set up the goal of narrowing down the disparities in public service
provision between rural and urban areas, but the local governments have recognized the
key role that such reforms should play. All in all, linking hukou reform to unification of
segmented social welfare system will help reduce the vulnerability of migrants in urban
areas.
2. Migration Policy Evolution in China
The rural-to-urban transfer of labor was no triumphant forward march running
completely smoothly. Looking back the evolution of migration policy in China, the
political economy plays important roles on policy making.
When examining the relationship between the urban employment situation and
attitudes towards the floating population, whenever employment pressure or the overt or
covert unemployment rate rises in the cities, city governments are inclined to take a more
stringent policy toward the floating population, adopting an attitude of exclusion towards
outside labor (Cai et al., 2001). Clearly, urban residents and governments regard the
outside labor flow as competitors for employment.
When the urban residents’ worries about external labor taking their jobs are
aggravated, they usually expressed in some way. At the same time, reforms create a dual
character on the part of the media: on the one hand, they are required to stay consistent
with government’s principles, intentions and main concerns, while on the other hand they
have to survive in a competitive market, and thus to a certain extent speak for the local
14
residents. This double bind or dual objectives reach a consensus in attitudes toward the
floating population. In other words, if urban people form exclusory sentiments vis à vis
the floating population due to being threatened by worries about their jobs, the media is
happy to express this for them, because it is often a concern of the local government.
Passing through specific political channels, the voice of local residents and the media,
thereby affects local policy measures regarding the mobile population. Under the existing
system, local governments are usually evaluated by a set of performance appraisal
mechanisms. There is usually a series of indicators for assessing local governments, some
of which are rigid, known as the “veto system”; “occurrence of major group incidents” is
one such rigid indicator, i.e., if it is ever substandard on this score, whatever the
government may have achieved on other fronts will be offset in the examination results.
Large-scale unemployment is a ready instigator of group incidents.
More importantly, given the dual economy which still relies on the countryside to
provide resource accumulation for industrialization, the policy trend of the entire urban-
rural relationship is still dominated by the renowned “paradox of numbers”: while the
farmers are many in number, their residence is scattered, their cost of collective action is
high, and their negotiation status in policy decisions is low (Olson, 1985). In contrast,
while the urban residents are small in number, they concentrate in political centres, where
their collective action readily affects social stability; hence their wishes are of greater
concern to policy makers. Over a very long time, urban attitudes to migrant workers are
therefore unfriendly. They are tightened or loosened up according to the state of urban
employment, and the institutional basis of this differential treatment is the residence
registration system. In other words, although the process of reform enabled rural workers
to cross regional boundaries, to work and reside in the city, migrant workers and the
floating population are subjected to unequal treatment in urban areas.
Above all, they were excluded from jobs at the early stage of reform and opening up.
Whenever there is pressure on jobs, many cities, in order to protect local urban workers’
jobs, often announce and implement manifestly discriminatory employment policies, e.g.,
that the only jobs open to the floating population are those that local workers are
unwilling to do. External workers thus can work only in the self-employed and informal
sectors, or with or non-formal employment status in the formal sector. In extreme cases,
15
city governments take measures to drive the migrants out.
Second is wage discrimination. Investigations have shown that in cities the average
wage of migrant workers is only 70% that of the local workforce. In this wage gap, some
43% cannot be explained by differences in level of education, and is caused mainly by
the factor of discrimination with regard to household registration status (Wang, 2007). In
addition foreign workers are excluded from both the compensation in kind and housing
subsidy that local businesses provide for their workers.
Third is exclusion from social security and public services. Minimum living standard
guarantee program and unemployment insurance, which are now universal in cities, are
directed solely at local residents, and the migrant population is not covered. Policy
requires the extension of equal treatment, including guaranteed age care and medical
insurance, to migrant workers, but the coverage they receive is actually very low. In
addition, the compulsory education migrant children receive also faces problems of
difficulty with admissions and high fees.
However, thanks to economic development that eases the employment pressure in
urban areas and the positive roles migrant workers play in urban economy, the migration
policy and the public attitude towards migrants have changed over time, which are
summarized as “from restriction and exclusion to protection and inclusion”. The changes
of migration policy embody the gradualism of the reforms in China. Labor mobility
across economic sectors and between rural and urban areas reflects not only the course of
sweeping away the institutional barriers but the process of labor market development.
During the transition, the migration policies play an essential role.
Looking back the policy evolution, the following stages mark main changes of
migration policies in China.
Strict Restriction: 1979-1983
At the early stages of the reforms, although the farmers were endowed rights to
make decisions on agricultural production, the labor mobility was still restricted. Due to
the insufficient supplies of agricultural products to urban areas, the planners tend to
control the surplus labor in agriculture to move out of rural areas. In addition, urban
16
China was struggling to provide enough job vacancies for those returned school graduates
from rural areas and the urban unemployed. For such reasons, rural to urban migration
was strictly controlled.
To prevent rural population from working in the cities, the government limited
recruiting workers from rural areas. Besides, the local governments cleared up the
employees from rural areas who are hired by urban employers. Some other
complementary policies had also been implemented. For instance, the domicile control
and food distribution in urban areas based on hukou were enforced. Those policies are
evidenced by Notice to Strict Control Rural Labor to Work in Urban Areas issued by the
State Council in 1981.
To ease the pressure of labor mobility out of rural areas, the Chinese government
encouraged the development of rural industry so as to provide local off-farm employment
opportunities for rural labor forces. The so called labor policy of leaving land without
leaving village stimulated the development of TVEs by provision with plentiful labor
resources, which also leads to a unique way to industrialize the rural China.
Permission to Migrate: 1984-1988
By the middle of 1980s, the HRS has already been extended to all the rural China,
which symbolized the completion of first stage of rural reform. In addition, some other
reforms on rural economic system, like the abolishment the People’s Commune System,
development of TVEs, have encouraged the labor mobility. Thanks to the successful
reforms in rural areas, China started reforming the urban economic system. The main
reformed areas include empowering the decision making of SOEs, increasing
employment flexibility of enterprises, and encouraging development of non-SOEs in
urban areas. Those reforms effectively promote the economic growth in urban areas and
increase the labor demand for rural surplus labor.
The economic growth in non-agricultural sectors led to the growth of employment
demand in 1990s. To meet the labor demand from TVEs in coastal areas and construction
in urban areas, it has been a necessary condition to allow labor mobility between rural
and urban areas and across regions. As a result, the Chinese government started
17
encouraging the labor mobility in rural areas and implemented a set of new policies. For
example, rural migrants who work or are self-employed in towns may register their
hukou in towns under the condition of making their own grain rations. The government
started allowing the farmers to sell some agricultural products and to have their own
business.
With economic development, the migration restriction has been further relaxed over
time. To encourage the integration of rural and urban economy, the service and
transportation sectors were opened to farmers then. SOEs were permitted to high rural
migrants in 19861. As an approach to poverty reduction for some rural areas, the Chinese
government formulated policies facilitating rural labor transfer from the central and
western regions. Those active migration policies resulted in fast growing migration flow
in the period.
Slow down the Unbridled Flow: 1989-1991
However, the active trend of migration policy was interrupted by macroeconomic
fluctuations sometimes. When the urban economic growth slows down, the policy makers
tend to protect the employment opportunities for urban residents by restricting rural
migration flow. The economic recession from 1989 to 1991 was one of the cases.
In 1988 a serious inflation caused by the overheated economy triggered the
macroeconomic adjustment in China. During the period of three year adjustment, the
central government required to compress the investment in capital construction and
tightened the fiscal and monetary policies. A lot of construction projects were abandoned
or stopped. China suffered from the lowest economic growth rates since 1978.
Under such a circumstance, the urban labor market situations took a turn for the
worse. To protect the employment opportunities for urban residents, a lot of migrant
workers were fired and local governments were required to strictly control the rural labor
forces to move out of rural areas. The restrictive policy is evidenced by Emergency
Notices on Strict Control with Farmers to Move out of Rural Areas issued by the State
Council in 1989. At the first time, the rural migration flow was defined as unbridled flow
                                                          
1 State Council (1986), Temporary Stipulations on Recruiting Workers for SOEs.   
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or blind flow (mangliu).
To ease the employment pressure in urban areas, the urban employers were required
to fire rural migrant workers and sent them back to rural areas. The government re-
emphasized the pattern of “leaving land without leaving village” for rural labor transfer
and encouraged local government providing employment opportunities for rural surplus
labor locally. However, the deteriorating macroeconomic situations formed a shock to
TVEs. The employment in TVEs began to decrease.
Due to the strict control for rural migration, the total size of migration shrank
during the period. In 1989 the number of migrants who lived in cities was significantly
less than the number in 1988.
  
Guide the Migration Flow: 1992-2000
With the increasing income disparities across regions and between rural and urban
areas, migration has been inevitable since then. Regarding to the migration policy, the
policy makers started realizing that it impossible to simply block the migration flow
through policies. Migration policy turned to a positive direction by normalizing migration
during this period.
The first practice is to establish 50 experimental counties developing rural human
resources from 1991 to 1994, and then the pilot was extended to 8 provinces from 1994
to 1996. Meanwhile, the government started emphasizing to strengthen administration on
rural to urban migration.   
However, the measures to strengthen management were to issue various credentials.
Before migration, rural farmers have to gain Migration Work Registration Card at local
governments of their hukou locality. At the destination places, migrants have to get
Employment License based on the card issued by government of origin places. By
holding both the Card and the License, migrants were available to get relevant
employment service from government agency. For migrants who live in destination
places more than one month need to apply temporary living certificates in order to
facilitate the hukou administration.
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Meanwhile, reforms on hukou system have been piloted in various regions. Migrant
workers who work and live in small town were allowed to own their non-agricultural
hukou. According to a regulation issued by central government in 1998, migrants who
have legal housing, stable employment or living sources, and living more than one year at
destination place were allowed to move their hukou registration to destination places.
However, the enforcement of the regulation varies across cities. In particular, big cities
where local residents are subsidized by local finance are reluctant to accept new comers,
so the paces of reform in big cities are very limited.
In addition, the training programs for rural labor forces and employment services
have been valued by the Chinese government since the period. For example, in 2001 the
Ministry of Labor and Social Securities issued a document, Notice on Improving the
Employment of Rural Labor Forces, to establish Labor Reservation System. The Ministry
also emphasized to improve the skills of migrants and to set up labor market information
system, which is the first time to promote the rural labor force transfer in the Ministry’s
policies.
Despite of attitude changes in government documents, at least in literal, the
treatment to migrants were still subject to the political economy that rooted from the
interests of urban residents. Since the late 1990s, a large number of urban workers have
been laid off by their employers and, as a result, the urban unemployment rate climbed
for a few years accompanying a declining labor force participation rate (Cai, et al., 2005).
The urban labor market dislocation was translated to migrant workers. To provide job
vacancies for the urban unemployed, many cities adopted employment protection for
local workers. Despite of the discrimination in terms of wage and working conditions,
migrants were excluded from some employment opportunities (Cai, et al., 2001).    
Treat Rural Migrants Friendly
Since 2000, relevant central government documents began to display active support
and encouragement for rural migration, clearly proposed reforming the institutional
segmentation between city and country, and eliminating the guiding ideas that
unreasonably restrict rural residents migrating to the city for work, which implies that
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China started integrating urban-rural employment policy.
In detail, the evolution of migration policies consists of the following aspects. One of
the positive changes was to remove fees imposed on migrants, including temporary living
fees, administration fees for migrants, and service fees for migrant workers, and etc. In
addition, the Chinese government started addressing the training for migrant workers. In
2003, the State Council issued Training Plans for Migrant Workers: 2003-2010, which
proposed that central and local governments should finance the training programs for
migrant workers.
The trend of this policy is unambiguous and stable and was clearly written into the
10th and 11th Five-Year Plans published in 2001 and 2006 respectively. By approaching
the flow of labor with encouragement, moreover, by creating fair conditions to improve
the migrants’ employment, accommodation, children’s education, and social security,
these policies have gradually became enforceable measures.
In 2006, Document No. 5 of the State Council entitled “State Council Suggestions on
Solving Certain Issues Regarding Migrant Workers,” upgraded the encouragement,
guidance and help of the flow of rural labor, to the level of “conforming to the objectives
of industrialization and urbanization”, focused attention on solving major problems in the
interests of the rural migrant workers, and proposed the principle of “fair and non-
discriminatory treatment”.
Passage of the Labor Contract Law in 2007 indicates the great importance that the
government attaches to protection of the rights and interests of ordinary workers,
including the migrant workers, and the policy orientation altered tremendously. The same
year the “Employment Promotion Act” directly targeted barriers to employment faced by
rural migrant workers in providing that: “rural laborers going to work in the city enjoy
equal labor rights with urban workers; setting discriminatory restrictions on rural workers
going to work in the city is prohibited.”
In addition, in 2008 the Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security
announced that the measures to transferable pension for migrant workers will be taken by
the end of 2008 (Yin, 2008). According to the announcement, the migrant workers will
have two options in terms of participation in pension system. For those who have stable
jobs in urban labor market, they will be allowed to join the urban pension system. As a
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complementary program, the migrant workers with high mobility, an portable individual
account will be designed and their accounts will be connected to current urban system if
the migrant workers want to do so.
These policy changes are positive responses of the Chinese government to realistic
institutional demands, and thus conform to the requirements of changes in the stage of
economic development. They may therefore eventually find expression in genuine
improvements in the conditions of migrant workers. A rough picture is that prior to 2003,
the basic wage levels of migrant workers’ saw no changes for recent decades, but with
the emergence of the labor shortage, they increased by 2.8% in 2004, 6.5% in 2005, and
11.5% in 2006 (outstripping the growth rate of the economy). At the same time, due to
the intervention of and role played by policy, migrant workers’ wage arrears have
decreased significantly, and their working and living conditions have been improved.
In the new century, local governments have made much greater efforts in reforming
hukou system. In recent years, one common practice in this reform area is to attempt to
establish a unified hukou regime integrating rural and urban population registration, by
abolishing the distinction between agricultural and non-agricultural hukou identities and
integrating them into a unified residential hukou. By 2007, there were 12 provinces
having carried out reforms of this kind. In addition, many cities further loosened criteria
of applying for local registration for family reunion, the elderly joining adult children,
youth joining parents, investors, the talented, local housing buyers.
Such a reform however has encountered some difficulties. One notable challenge
facing local governments is that the nature of hukou is not simply a population
registration system, but welfare benefits contained in it. An attraction of urban hukou is
its entitlement of access to social security and other public services, whose provision is
affiliated with local hukou status and differentiated between rural and urban areas. Even
if a city announces an unified population registration system, or loosens criteria for
migrants to apply for local hukou, if it’s fiscal capability is constrained to provide
universal public services to all residents regardless of their origins – that is, both previous
urban and rural residents can get access to equal social welfare and public services, such
a change in method of population registration is meaningless. In reality, reforms of this
kind in most cities that announced unified hukou registration and identity but failed to
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keep it accompanied with related entitlements because of fiscal constraints have been
actually hovering.
3. Lewisian Turning Point and Its implications
In this section, we will illustrate the newly emerging issue in the Chinese labor
market, that is, the evidence of coming Lewisian turning point and its implications to
labor protection and economic development. Thanks to fast economic growth in the past
a few decades, Chinese economy created more and more job opportunities. In the
meantime, demographic transition has shown its effect on labor market. In recent years,
the labor shortage and wage rising indicate that China reaches Lewisian turning point,
which means that a significant change happened for labor market development.
Evidences of Lewisian Turning Point
As the result of demographic transition and declining participation rates, labor
shortage appears in China’s labor market. The direct evidence of coming Lewisian
turning point is the labor shortage that appeared in 2003. In coastal areas where are the
most developed regions in China, it is widely reported on shortage of both skilled and
unskilled workers in recent years. Some preliminary investigations observe the labor
shortage happening in the past few years. The Ministry of Labor and Social Security
confirmed the labor shortage after an investigation in coastal areas. The survey conducted
in 2749 villages of rural China indicated that three fourth of villages exhausted their
young human resources (Cai, 2007). As time goes by, the phenomenon of labor shortages
has not gone away but has spread to the Yangtze River Delta region, and even to
provinces in central China, from which migrant laborers are generally sent out.
This trend is also demonstrated by demographic data in rural areas. If we look at
age profile of rural migrants, we may find there is only very limited number of those who
are below 30 years old and work in agriculture. Let’s first observe current labor force
distribution in terms of the types of economic activities. If excluding the labor that left
sending places more than 6 months, using 1% Population Sampling Survey data in 2005,
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we may look at the distribution of local labor forces as Figure 4 presents. Our focus
group is those who worked in agriculture and accounted for 72 percent of local labor
forces in 2005 because the unemployment rate in rural areas is pretty low and farmers
who are engaged in off-farm work or work outside less than 6 months could be taken as
transferred labor. The total number of this group was 324 million whereas the surplus
number of rural labor varies depending on the estimation for labor use in agriculture.
Figure 4 the Distribution of Local Labor Forces
54.24, 12%
323.69, 72%
10.59 , 2%
64.17, 14%
less than 6 months migration local farm work local off-farm work unemployment and out of labor market 
After a Probit estimation including variables reflecting individual characteristics, we
may predict the probability of migration for each individual as per his/her personal
characteristics. Based on the predicted probability, we can get average probability of
migration for each group people categorized by age or education so as to visualize the
impacts of demographic transition on migration. As Figure 5 displays, the probability of
migration did vary among different education groups and the probability declines with
age increasing for each group. It is easy to find out that the migration probability for
people who have low education and aged more than 40 years old is particularly low.
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Figure 5 Predicted Probabilities by Age and Education Group
We sum up the above findings by age and education group, see appendix. The first
column in the table is the current labor resources in agriculture, and it gives the maximum
potentials for labor use in non-agriculture sectors. The second column presents average
group probability according to individual probability predicted from the Probit
estimation. The last column displays the predicted amount of migration from current
labor resources. As the table shows the fact that labor forces remaining in agriculture are
dominated by those aged labor with low human capital. Accordingly they are laborers
who have low probability to work in off-farm sectors. The summation of the last column
gives the total number of 43.57 million labor forces that available for non-agricultural
industries.
The other indication of labor shortage is the rising average wage. Breaking through
the constant level of average wages of migration workers for decade, average wages of
migration workers started rising up a few years ago. According to surveys on migration
workers, in 2006 the wages of migration workers increased more than 10 percent than
previous year (Cai, 2007). As Table 6 presents, the average wages for both migrants and
local workers have kept growing in recent years. Considering that labor productivity of
agriculture is lower than many countries due to the land tenure, agriculture still requires a
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large amount of labor input. In addition, old labor forces in rural areas have relatively
lower years of schooling and are more incapable of working in non-farm sectors than the
young generation. It is good to believe that China has already faced with the Lewisian
Turning Point and ended the era of unlimited labor supply.
Table 6 Wage Increase in Urban Labor Market (yuan/month)
Migrants (NBS) Migrants (MOA) Local Workers
Nominal Real Nominal Real Nominal Real
2001 644 644.0 - - 903 896.7
2002 659 665.7 - - 1031 1041.4
2003 702 702.8 781 774.0 1164 1153.6
2004 780 755.9 802 776.4 1327 1284.6
2005 861 821.3 855 841.5 1517 1493.1
2006 946 889.0 953 938.9 1738 1712.3
2007 1015a 912.8 1060 1014.4 2078 1988.5
Note: “a” is the average monthly earnings for the first three quarter in 2007.
Source: urban local wages are from China statistical Abstract (2008), and migrants wages
are from Statistical Report of NBS and Research Center of Rural Economy, MOA.
It is worth noting that the Chinese labor market approaching to LTP is mainly driven
by the demographic transition, which is a long term trend and can not be reversed in the
short run. Despite of shocks caused by economic cycle, for instance, recent financial
tsunami, the judgment of Chinese economy closing to the turning point is still
unchangeable.
The implications to rural-urban divide
It is widely observed that migration is ultimate factor narrowing down the rural-to-
urban income gap, as a result of Lewisian dual economy development. Dual economy
development commonly passes through two turning points. First is the one we described
above. At this point the growth of demand for migrant workers exceeds the increase of
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labor released from the pool of surplus labor force so that the wage rate of migrant
workers increases. Second turning point is reached when the gap of marginal productivity
of labor between rural and urban sectors disappears so that there is no more dual
economy. Passing the first turning point implies, therefore, that the rural-urban income
gap will have declined in a much faster pace until the second point arrives, under the
conditions that enable the Lewis turning point to combine with Kuznets turning point (the
point at which income inequality shifts from increase to decline).
After reform began in late 1978, the income gap between rural and urban areas fell
and then increased after the late 1980s. An international comparison shows that this
income gap is among the largest in the world (Yang and Cai, 2003). The widely
acknowledged rural–urban income gap, however, is calculated in nominal terms and,
hence the impacts of different price changes between rural and urban sectors are omitted.
If we deflate household incomes per capita by rural and urban price indices, respectively,
the gap in 2006 reaches the level of 1978 when rural reform was initiated; that is, in both
the starting and ending years, the ratio of urban household income per capita to rural
household income per capita in real terms was 2.57, instead of the nominal ratio of 3.28
(see Figure 6).
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Figure 6 Nominal and Real Income Gap between Rural and Urban Areas,
1978–2006
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Even if for the income gap is calculated in real terms, it is very likely to be
overestimated due to misplacement of statistical data. A critical problem lies in the
division between rural and urban populations. When NBS urban and rural socio-
economic survey teams conduct household surveys, they cover mainly two kinds of
household: urban residence households and rural permanent households, but omit migrant
households floating from rural to urban areas. Usually migrants are excluded from being
chosen as households keeping accounts for NBS purposes in urban areas, and the income
of rural households does not fully reflect migrants’ earnings except for a certain fraction
of remittance. As the size of this omitted population grows, its share of earnings in total
income of rural and urban residents increases. Migrant households’ income inevitably
changes the contrast range between the two groups. Therefore, we should now compare
income differentials in distinguishing between three groups of populations; namely, urban
native residents, rural permanent residents, and rural-to-urban migrants.
As for those who migrate to urban areas for less than 6 months, they float between
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rural and urban areas frequently, which affect the actual distribution between rural and
urban populations. Although the current definition distinguishing between rural and
urban populations has incorporated the migrants with more than 6 months stay into urban
populations, they could hardly be included in the sampling framework of household
surveys, because the absence of formal hukou status makes them unstable in residence.
Missing income of long-term migrant households brings about information insufficiency
and distortion on actual income in urban areas. Based on data provided by NBS (2006),
in 2005, disposable per capita income of urban households was 10, 493 yuan, whereas the
net income per capita of rural households was only 3255 yuan. However, according to
CULS survey, per capita income of rural-to-urban migrant households was 8368 yuan,
equivalent of 2.6 times per capita income of rural households and 80 percent of that of
urban households. Although we can hardly claim a disappearance in rural urban income
gaps, the huge magnitude of the migrant population undoubtedly serves to minimize the
rural–urban income gap.
The Implications to Labor Protection
As we mentioned earlier, migrant workers are a vulnerable group in urban labor
market in terms of social protection. The coming Lewisian turning point is also a turning
point for labor protection. The implications of such a turning point to labor protection are
reflected by the following aspects.
During the era of unlimited labor supply, the ceaseless labor flow out of agriculture
weakened the bargaining power of labor. Facing powerful employers, workers are in a
disadvantageous position. First, the employers make employment decisions in terms of
hiring how many workers and what types of workers they want. Second, due to the
unlimited labor supply, the employers tend to offer the very basic level of wage rate that
was above the workers’ productivity in agriculture but below the marginal productivity in
current work. Since there was no negotiation process in employment decision and wage
formation, the employees have little power to determine the procedure. Third, the
employees lack of power to determine some other important aspects of the work. For
example, in general the employee makes decision on daily working time, working
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intensity, and working conditions. So they are always obliged to accept conditions
unbeneficial to themselves. Under such circumstance, even if the laborers require to raise
wages and to improve the labor protection conditions, the enterprises would not commit
to do so.
The coming of the Lewisian turning point means the greater need of the labor force
and brings more job opportunities to laborers, which enhances the laborers’ right to speak
in the laborer-employer negotiation because laborers can impose stress on employers
through voting with feet. Therefore, the employers have to pay more attention to
improving working conditions and labor protections as well as raising the wages. In
addition, the government is promoting the tripartite talk mechanism for employment and
wage decisions, which increases the opportunities for workers to express their demand
for wage rates, working conditions, and other work related requirements.
According to the survey on shortage of migration workers in China’s southeastern
coastal area in 2004, the labor shortage mainly occurred in the small-sized and medium-
sized private enterprises in which the workers usually are lack of labor contract
arrangements and have to work overtime, and earn low wages. In contrast, the enterprises
with good labor protection and high wage offers have no trouble in recruiting enough
migration workers. Thus, under the conditions of being short of labor supply, enterprises
must improve laborers’ treatments so as to reduce the reservation wages for those who
were out of labor market previously. The new changes of the supply and demand of labor
force in China make more and more entrepreneurs follow “enterprises shouldering social
responsibilities” with great interest.
In China, local governments take the responsibility of keeping economic
development in local areas. In addition, the local governments are responsible for social
stability too. For those reasons, the decisions of local governments were often rooted
from political concerns. For example, during the period of unlimited labor supply, the
local governments were required to protect local residents’ employment opportunities,
which led them to make policy excluding rural migration workers in urban labor market.
When facing with the situations of labor shortage, attracting the migration workers is of
importance to guarantee the labor input and then sustain local economic growth. Under
such situation, local governments tend to make friendly policies for migrants. For
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example, in recent years some practices on social security system have been applied in
coastal areas in order to cover migration workers. In addition, local government plays
active role on labor market by passing on the information about labor supply and job
opportunities so as to mitigate the impacts of labor shortage.
The Implications to Migration Policies
With the coming Lewisian turning point, China needs to change the directions of
migration policies from suppressing labor supply into digging out the potentials for labor
supply. In general, there are two aspects of policy changes to tap the potentials for labor
supply. One of them is to make good use of current population at labor age and
economically activate them as much as possible. The other is by all means to improve
labor quality through accumulating human capital and strengthening the linkage between
human capital formation and labor market.
As we have already shown in Figure 4, it is hard to say China is a country with
surplus labor in agriculture now. However, it does not mean that China does not have the
potentials for labor supply anymore. In the era of unlimited labor supply, the employers
tend to hire young and productive workers at low costs. When approaching the turning
point, the labor costs for hiring the specific group of workers start increasing and the
comparative advantage of old workers is raised.
In addition to quantity concerns, improvement of the quality of labor forces is
another means to exploiting labor supply. Accumulation of human capital is also the
necessary preparation for upgrading the industrial structure. The practice of Newly
Industrialized Economies has already proved that accumulation of human capital was one
of the essential drivers to push economic growth. China has the similar process of human
capital accumulation to NIEs. For example, in 2004 Chinese working labor forces had
similar educational attainment with those in Korea in 1990 when the latter just finished
the period of high speed of economic growth.
However, China has its unique pattern of demographic transition. As we have
already noted earlier, the younger labor forces who were educated during the period of
the Reform and Opening-up are not surplus anymore, while the old labor forces with low
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human capital seem to be incapable of working out of agriculture. Therefore, in the next
decade, the focus of increasing human capital accumulation will be put on the old labor
forces and the means to this group of people differs from the younger generation. For old
labor forces, training and skill development are important rather than formal education.
Given such a distribution of education attainment among labor forces, in addition to
formal education, the training system plays more important and timely role in
contemporary China. For those aged labors that have low level of educational attainment,
it is hard to increase their human capital through formal education system. In contrast,
some appropriate skills may be helpful for them to participate into urban labor market.
Considering that young labor forces in rural areas are nearly exhausted, it is more
important to make good use of the old group of labor forces than ever before. According
to the survey done by NBS (NBS, 2006), in 2005 the proportion of migrant workers who
were trained accounted for 34.4 percent of total migrant workers, while in 2004 the
number was 28.2 percent. The number indicates there is a large share of migration
workers who need to be trained. As far as the farmers remaining in agriculture are
concerned, the necessity of training is even more urgent because they mainly consist of
labor forces with low educational attainments.
4. Relevance of Chinese Experiences to Other Developing Economies
Migration is an internationally recognized development phenomenon prevailing in
developing countries. However, its impacts on development differ among countries.
Concerning internal migration, it is not always and everywhere a stimulus of successful
economic growth and sometimes it even causes economic inequality and social instability
due to its spontaneous nature and other institutional constraints. As for international
migration, whereas there are income gains for family, community and even country from
remittances, it is hardly linked to domestic development. China’s international migration,
comparing to such lessons, has been mainly productive and beneficial for all
stakeholders. In this section, we will summarize China’s experiences in migration and
changes in policy towards it, and try to draw implications to other developing countries.
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4.1 Migration as an approach to development
In most developing countries, comparing to other factors of production, labor is the
most abundant and important resource for development. Developing countries are
characterized by their dual economy in which labor force is redundant in agricultural
sector and marginal productivity of agricultural laborers is extremely low (Lewis, 1958).
Migration is one of the effective ways to take advantage of human resources and gains
reallocation efficiency of resources. The Chinese experiences indicate that migration is an
intrinsic aspect of economic and social life when people naturally seek out opportunities
to improve their welfare and the well-being of their families. However, it is not always
utilized as a development tool effectively. The first lesson can be learnt from Chinese
experiences is that policy matters.
Policy towards migration is considered as part of economic development policy
implemented and modified by the central and local governments. The great role that
central and local governments play in its economic development is commonly viewed as
a significant feature of China’s development, a phenomenon called developmental state
functioning as a firm (Oi, 1999; Walder, 1995). By recognizing migration as a tool to spur
economic development, the Chinese governments, both central and local, adjust the
policy-orientation towards migration over time in consistent with the stages of its
development and reform.
At the early stage of reform, while urban sector was not ready to accept rural
migrant workers, the government saw the necessity for surplus labor force released by
introduction of household responsibility system and encouraged agricultural laborers to
transform from farming to rural forestry, animal husbandry and fishery and local industry.
As rural labor became further redundant and non-agricultural activities in small towns
developed, the government allowed laborers to migrate to those small towns near their
home villages. As reform in urban sector deepened and non-public owned enterprises
expanded – that is, the urban sector demands for more extra laborers, rural-to-urban
migration became common. In that period, although migrant workers were not publicly
recognized as necessary supply of labor in economic growth, the government decision-
making was correctly made due to its concern of farmers’ income enhancement.
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On the other hand, rural-to-urban migration has contributed largely to economic
growth during the reform period, and when the inevitability of urbanization and
industrialization was revealed as non-agricultural sectors substantially expanded since
China’s WTO entry, the government policy towards migration became more active and
encouraging. Now, encouraging migration and creating better political climate for
migrant workers are officially stated tasks of every levels of government.
4.2 Development as an approach to migration
At the same time, the economic growth is the complementary to migration process.
It is hard to believe that China would successfully make use of migration without strong
economic growth but simply opening the urban labor market. In China, labor mobility is
dominant in migration because the fast growing regions provide plenty of employment
opportunities.
It is development that creates employment opportunities. That is why we commonly
see surplus labor in developing countries but migration only works in a few cases.
Productive migration is not dependent activity of economic development but a function
of economic growth which is vital to provide opportunities of employment for migrants
and to motivate migration.
To break through the common dilemma lacking capital in developing countries, at
the early stage of reform and opening-up, China put priority to attracting foreign capital
in order to seek economic growth. At that time, the governments treat migration as
secondary factor after direct goal of national or regional growths of GDP.
However, since then the economic booming has created hundreds of thousands of
jobs for migrant workers. Especially after China entered WTO and became world
manufacturing center, the strong demand for migrant workers led the government attitude
shifting from tolerating migration (aiming at enhancing farmers’ income) to encouraging
migration (in order to obtain sufficient supply of labor force for industry sectors) and
protecting migrants (to maintain social stability). Therefore, a multi winning outcomes
are formed: (1) migration provides mass supply of labor for economic growth to actualize
comparative advantage in labor intensive industries, (2) the Chinese economy gains
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reallocation efficiency of labor (Cai and Wang, 1999), and (3) rural households earn
higher income from off-farm activities (Figure 7).
Figure 7 Increases in Migrant Workers, Total Earnings and Wage Rate
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4.3 The effect of gradual reforms on migration
It is no doubt that the institutional legacy from planning economic system has
created extraordinary barriers between rural and urban areas. The migration, which has
emerged in China since the 1980s and accelerated since the 1990s, is characterized not
only as the economic transformation from an agriculture-dominated economy to an
industrial one, a common phenomenon in developing countries with a result of
urbanization, but also as its unique economic transition from a planned economy to a
market economy. The feature as transition with Chinese characteristics helps China
gradually push forward its urbanization during the reform and catch up with normal state
that China lagged behind in pre-reform period. The Chinese experiences in gradual
reforms could be reflected by the following aspects.
First of all, it is important to realize the potential negative outcomes of migration. In
35
some countries, like China, migration could result in a more efficient allocation of human
resources that spurs overall economic development and reduces disparities between the
sending and receiving areas. However, the risk also exists that rural-to-urban migration
could lead to overcrowding in cities and increased social tensions and costs, while
emptying rural areas of their best educated and most productive. To this point, the policy-
makers are justifiably concerned about potentially negative social outcomes and the
sequences of policy making are very important.
Second, although the migration flow is from rural to urban, it is good to believe that
rural development should be addressed too. At the early stage of the reform, there was a
large stock of surplus labor, which is commonly observed in many developing countries.
It is difficult to move the surplus labor out of rural areas by simply relying on the
development in urban areas. The Chinese experiences suggest that rural industrialization
is an effective way to keep growth and labor transfer in a harmonious way. With
economic development, the rural development involves a wide range of policies
including education, training, social security, land tenure system, and rural taxation
policies, and etc.
Finally, the policy makers need carefully select the steps. As noted above, because of
the political complexities associated with reforms, a strategy to support migrants must
pay close attention to short-run vs. long-run priorities, sequencing, and tradeoffs. It might
be similar in other developing countries; the strategy needs to address concerns that urban
residents have about job loss and welfare loss because of migration although the future
goal of rural-urban integration is clear. These concerns have become more serious with
the increase in urban layoffs and unemployment when exogenous shocks happened.
Reforms also need to address the concerns that urban governments have about fiscal
liabilities if they are to provide services to migrants, which explain the reluctance of
many local governments to continue their hukou reform.
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Appendix
Appendix 1 Rural Labor Forces and Migration Probability
Age and Education Group Number of
labor
(million)
Predicted
Probability
Predicted Migrants
(million)
16-20 17.16 - 4.97
Primary School or below 4.44 0.189 0.84
Jr. High School 12.03 0.315 3.78
Sr. High School or above 0.69 0.505 0.35
21-30 50.08 - 11.18
Primary School or below 15.39 0.142 2.18
Jr. High School 32.24 0.248 7.99
Sr. High School or above 2.46 0.410 1.01
31-40 88.96 - 13.44
Primary School or below 39.45 0.109 4.31
Jr. High School 46.69 0.178 8.29
Sr. High School or above 2.82 0.298 0.84
41-50 76.48 - 8.29
Primary School or below 39.86 0.078 3.10
Jr. High School 30.52 0.123 3.76
Sr. High School or above 6.10 0.235 1.43
50 and above 93.7 - 5.69
Primary School or below 76.3 0.053 4.04
Jr. High School 15.51 0.084 1.30
Sr. High School or above 1.88 0.182 0.34
All 326.39 - 43.57
